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Abstract: Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are
observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves
a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their
advantage. Delay in agreement occurs even if all experimentally controlled information
is common knowledge. This paper rationalizes both regularities coherently by modeling
heterogeneous social preferences, either self-interest or envy, of one bargaining party
as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening
and signaling.
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1. Introduction
In bargaining situations, the price and terms of a transaction can be disputed by the seller and the
buyer of a good or service before an eventual agreement. Thereby, each bargaining party has bargaining
power that can shift, for instance, through credibly establishing a not directly observable quality like
social preferences. In order to investigate how one of numerous individually rational and Pareto optimal
divisions might be agreed, Sta˚hl [1] and Rubinstein [2] first proposed structural models of alternating-offer
bargaining that postulate strategic interaction between two bargainers. The presumed bargaining outcome
depends on both bargainers’ preferences and how bargainers capitalize on their relative impatience. For
purely self-interested, similarly impatient bargainers and complete information, the equilibrium predicts
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immediate agreement on a larger share for the bargainer that starts the bargaining. This prediction is in
contrast with the practical experience of delay in agreement and divisions more equal than forecast; both
of which are well-documented regularities also studied in experiments (e.g., Bolton, Ochs and Roth, Weg
et al. [3–5]).
This paper shows how equal division or one to two periods of delay occur in the equilibrium of a three
period alternating-offer bargaining model with social preferences if a heterogeneity in one bargainer’s
preferences is private information. Previous works explained either delay by incomplete information or
the bias toward the equal division by social preferences that include a form of interpersonal comparison.
Building on the framework of Sta˚hl, I assume that the first mover, who starts the bargaining and is
arbitrarily called the seller, is commonly known to be entirely self-interested whereas the second mover,
named the buyer, can be either self-interested or perfectly envious. Ample evidence indicates that at least
some people compare themselves to others, which can include aspects of envy (e.g., Camerer, Cooper and
Kagel, Smith [6–8]). The perfectly envious buyer prefers disagreement to anything less than the equal
division. This simplified distributional concern stylizes the response to absolute and relative payoffs that
motivates some social preferences. Envy can also be interpreted as loss aversion with respect to a fixed
reference point at the equal division. Furthermore, bargaining with perfect envy is strategically equivalent
to bargaining with a credible reputation of not accepting less than equal division.
The optimal behavior in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a three period alternating-offer bargaining
model is either an immediate equal division of the surplus, and its certain acceptance, or gradual reduction
of an initially high demand over the course of the game. Latter behavior leads to an occasional acceptance
of the high demand by a self-interested buyer or to up to two periods of delay before an agreement on
the equal division else. One period of delay is caused by the seller’s desire to discover the buyer’s true
type allowing the interpretation of delay as the result of a failed first mover gamble that the second mover
is self-interested. Further delay results from the signaling game in which the envious buyer wants to
credibly show his type after an initial high demand by the seller. Whether the equilibrium of the three
period alternating-offer bargaining model supports pooling or separating the two buyer types depends on
their frequency and the bargainers’ impatience to reach agreement. The game only has an equilibrium in
pure strategies if the share of self-interested buyers or the bargainers’ impatience remains low enough. As
the perfectly envious buyer achieves at least the equal division, his situation is strategically equivalent to
bargaining with an outside option of half of the surplus.
The next section reviews related literature. Section 3 presents the model and Section 4 derives the
optimal behavior under uncertainty about the buyer preferences. Section 5 discusses the bargaining
outcomes, then Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Informational disparities between bargaining parties are understood as a fundamental
reason for delay in agreement. Various models of alternating-offer bargaining (e.g.,
Chatterjee and Samuelson, Cramton, Grossman and Perry, Gul and Sonnenschein,
Rubinstein [9–14]) and of one-sided offer bargaining (e.g., Cramton, Fudenberg et al., Sobel and
Takahashi [15–17]) employ incomplete information about a characteristic of the bargainers to explain
delay. Often the first mover is assumed to be uninformed (e.g., Ausubel and Deneckere, Grossman
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and Perry, Gul and Sonnenschein, Rubinstein, Sobel and Takahashi [12–14,17,18]). Valuation of the
bargaining good, outside options, the individual cost of bargaining or personal risk attitude, all may be
private information and have been studied. Ausubel et al. [19] and Roth [20] provide overviews. In a
bargaining setting with asymmetrically informed inequality averse parties, a fully efficient mechanism
in the form of a double auction exists only if compassion is strong. Less compassionate parties do
not trade in the double auction in the limit of infinitely strong envy [21]. Given one-sided incomplete
information in two sequential bargaining experiments, the role of inferences was tested by Srivastava [22]
with experimentees who completed questionnaires that measured perceptions of fairness and opponent’s
level of competitiveness. Srivastava conjectured that uninformed bargainers infer their opponents’
competitiveness rather than assess and refine a probabilistic assessment of the private information based
on the informed bargainer’s behavior. Studying uncertainty about the opponent’s social preferences in an
alternating-offer bargaining model supplements these literatures and bridges the theoretical gap between
well-understood consequences of incomplete information in bargaining and the research that suggest that
some players care about distributional aspects.
Uncertainty about social preferences has already been studied in different contexts. Von Siemens [23]
considers investment incentives in a hold-up problem, in which the returns to relationship-specific
investments are allocated by bargaining amongst individuals with heterogeneous social preferences that
are private information. The investments can signal preferences and, thereby, influence beliefs and
bargaining behavior. In consequence, bargainers might choose not to signal unfavorable information. Von
Siemens [24] studies employment contracts if workers ability and their social preferences are private
information. The paper finds that it is “not possible to screen workers according to their social preferences
within the firm” but that “the firm can exclude inequity averse workers with low ability by offering
employment contracts that do not compensate any suffering from rent differences in the firm.”
In alternating-offer bargaining, social preferences have been studied in a complete information context.
De Bruyn and Bolton [25], Goeree and Holt [26], and Bolton [3] study the influence of distributional
concerns and self-interest on finite horizon alternating-offer bargaining behavior. The first group of
authors estimates quadratic inequality aversion preferences, introduced by Bolton and Ockenfels [27],
for a representative agent based on preexisting data from different bargaining games. They conclude
that self-interest and distributional concern “offer better predictions than traditional preference models
that ignore fairness considerations.” Goeree and Holt [26] conducted an alternating-offer bargaining
experiment in which, independently of the bargaining outcome, role-specific commonly known payments
are made to the participants. In their experiment, average offers are biased toward the equal division of
the overall income. They argue that a distributional concern is necessary to explain the observed behavior
and estimate significant linear inequality aversion preferences as introduced by Fehr and Schmidt [28]
based on the experimental data. How guilt or envy affects either party’s bargaining power and, thus,
the outcome of open-ended alternating-offer bargaining is shown by Kohler [29,30]. Compassionate
bargainers reach agreement in the first period. If guilt is strong, they divide the bargaining surplus
equally. If guilt is weak, the bargaining outcome is tilted away from the Rubinstein [2] division towards
a more unequal split. Also envious bargainers reach agreement in the first period. Bargaining shares
increase in the strength of own envy. Envy can cause divisions more unequal than predicted by Rubinstein,
but, if equally patient bargainers exhibit a similar degree of envy, then the bargaining outcome is tilted
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away from the Rubinstein division towards the equal split. Similarly, envy’s more generic form—loss
aversion—may be a disadvantage in bargaining [31]. When comparisons with others cause guilt and
envy, the underlying preferences are often called inequality or inequity aversion. Inequality aversion
can also increase the asymmetry of the payoff division in bargaining games like legislative bargaining
games, in which unanimity is not required [32]. None of these papers consider the influence of incomplete
information about social preferences on bargaining.
Bolton’s [3] paper on fairness preferences in bargaining is the most closely related work. He collected
data in a large scale bargaining experiment and postulated a formal model, in which bargainers receive
utility from two sources. One source is the amount of money earned from agreement while the other is a
relative comparison of money earnings incorporated into the utility function as an index. Utility includes
this fairness index and is defined such that it combines self-interest with an additional utility gain from
obtaining a division closer to the equal division for the bargainer who receives the smaller share. If a player
can achieve an advantageous share, then, ceteris paribus, an earlier period agreement is preferred to a later
agreement. This comparative model is consistent with five enumerated bargaining regularities. First, offers
deviate from the narrow self-interest equilibrium in the direction of the equal division. Second, opening
offers are frequently rejected. Third, disadvantageous counteroffers frequently come after rejected first
period offers. Fourth, there is a consistent proposer advantage. Fifth, discounting affects the outcome. The
comparative model predicts all but delay of agreement under complete information. Bolton emphasized
that the “comparative model assumes that subjects have complete information about one another’s utility
function. In reality, however, they do not. [...] The marginal rate of substitution between absolute and
relative money most likely varies by individual, making utility functions private information.” Evaluating
the observed experimental behavior, Bolton developed an intuition how subjects handle the supposable
preference uncertainty: “Proposers must search. [...] Searching proceeds roughly as follows. Based on a
subject’s prior, he makes an offer. If it is rejected, he makes a more generous offer in the next period.” The
following analysis of the optimal behavior under that kind of incomplete information about heterogeneous
preferences formally elicits the screening and signaling of preferences within bargaining at the cost of
occasional delay of agreement in equilibrium conjectured by Bolton.
3. Model
Within three periods, two players, a seller and a buyer of a good, have to reach agreement on the
division of a trade surplus, which is normalized to one, by naming a price pt ∈ [0, 1]. The price pt defines
the share of the surplus that the seller receives and 1 − pt is the residual share of the surplus received
by the buyer in period t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The surplus results from a potential buyer’s valuation of an object
that exceeds the seller’s reservation price. It depreciates with a common discount factor 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 after
any disagreement.
Before the bargaining starts, nature moves by drawing the buyer preferences. By asking a price in
periods 1 and 3, the seller proposes a sharing rule for the surplus that the buyer can accept or reject. The
game ends once the buyer accepts a price. If the buyer rejects the seller’s price p1 in period 1, then the
buyer can propose a new sharing rule p2 in period 2 that the seller can accept or reject. If the seller accepts
the buyer’s counteroffer, the bargaining ends. If the buyer rejects the seller’s price in period 3, then the
surplus shrinks to zero and the game ends.
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The self-interested seller s derives utility from his absolute payoff us(pt) = pt. The buyer b ∈ {c, e}
can be one of two types. With probability q ∈ (0, 1) he is also self-interested (or competitive) and has
utility uc(pt) = 1 − pt. With probability 1 − q he cares about absolute and relative payoffs such that
his utility is affected by a loss factor of infinity, interpreted as envy, when receiving less than half of
the surplus:
ue(pt) =
{
1− pt if pt ≤ 0.5
−∞ if pt > 0.5
The buyer type is private information, but the seller knows the distribution of the preferences in the
population and, at any time, holds a belief µt that the other bargaining party is self-interested. The utility
of the envious buyer represents an asymmetric limiting case of inequality aversion, put forward by Fehr
and Schmidt or Bolton and Ockenfels [27,28], and extensions thereof [33,34] or loss aversion, introduced
by Kahneman and Tversky [35], with respect to an equal split. The model of a perfectly envious buyer and
a self-interested seller is included in Bolton’s [3] comparative model. Its implied inflexible demands have
been studied before in the context of bargaining and reputation (e.g., Abreu and Gul, Myerson [36,37]).
By simplifying some distributional social preferences, the model links different literatures and gives a
behavioral reinterpretation the previous ad hoc assumption of inflexible demands.
A game with a maximum length of three periods is the shortest game to study different length of delay
and in which the seller, who is the first mover, can make one counteroffer. If players share a common
discount factor, stronger bargaining power is with the proposing player that also collects at least half of
the surplus in open-ended alternating-offer bargaining.
4. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The model is solved for a pure strategy equilibrium. Due to the incomplete information, the solution
concept applied is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). The PBE is one of two types depending on
whether the self-interested seller can distinguish a self-interested from an envious buyer. In a separating
equilibrium, the seller can infer the buyer’s private information completely. In a pooling equilibrium, the
seller learns nothing about the buyer’s preferences. Whether there is a pooling or separating equilibrium
is determined by the probability q of bargaining with a self-interested buyer, which is implied by the
frequency of this preference in the population, and the players’ common discount factor δ (Figure 1).
Proposition 1. Let (pt, t) denote the bargaining outcome if a player accepts pt in period t:
(P) If δ ≤ 0.5 and q ≤ 1−2δ2
2−2δ , if 0.5 < δ ≤ 23 and q ≤ 1−δ
2
2−δ(2−δ) or if q ≤ 0.5, then there is a pooling
equilibrium. Its outcome is (0.5, 1).
(S1) If δ ≤ 0.5 and q > 1−2δ22−2δ , then there is a separating equilibrium. Its outcome is ((1− δ(1− δ), 1) if
the buyer is self-interested. Its outcome is (δ, 2) if the buyer is envious.
(S2) If 0.5 < δ ≤ 23 and q > 1−δ
2
2−δ(2−δ) , then there is a separating equilibrium. Its outcome is (1 − δ
(1− δ), 1) if the buyer is self-interested. Its outcome is (0.5, 3) if the buyer is envious.
Proof Follows from lemmas 1–3 in the appendix.
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Proposition 2. If δ > 2
3
and 0.5 < q < 1, then no PBE in pure strategies exists.
Proof See appendix.
Proposition 3. The PBE in pure strategies is unique if δ ≤ 2
3
or q ≤ 0.5, and if the seller’s belief remains
unchanged, i.e., µt = µt−1, whenever Bayesian updating is not possible.
Proof Solving the game by backward induction in lemmas 1–3 given the equilibrium beliefs rules out
other equilibria in pure strategies. 
Figure 1. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium for q ∈ (0, 1).
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Notes: P pooling equilibrium with no delay. S1 separating equilibrium with one period delay if buyer is envious. S2 separating
equilibrium with two periods delay if buyer is envious.  no pure strategy equilibrium.
The strategies and seller beliefs supporting the equilibrium are formally reported in the appendix.
Figures 2(a)–2(c) also summarize them, grouped by parameter values, in the game tree of the bargaining
problem. The game trees start with the seller decision in period 1, in which he offers to a self-interested
buyer with probability q or to an envious one with probability 1 − q. The seller’s respective belief to
bargain with a self-interested buyer is denoted in square brackets at his decision nodes. Players’ utility
values (rather than payoffs) are denoted in parentheses. The information sets and utilities of minor
interest are suppressed. The game is truncated after period 2, but relevant period 3 continuation games
are represented below the dotted line. Optimal behavior and the equilibrium outcomes are emphasized.
Red lines indicate the paths to the pooling and separating equilibrium outcomes, which are marked with
a dotted and dashed border, respectively. Blue lines indicate continuation games that are only reached
by mistake (black lines) in equilibrium. The behavior after a division not represented in the game tree
equals the behavior illustrated in the continuation game of the incrementally higher seller/lower buyer
reservation price depicted in the corresponding period.
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Figure 2. (a) Pooling equilibrium. (b) Pooling or separating equilibrium with one period of delay. (c) Pooling or separating equilibrium
with two periods of delay.
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Figure 2(a) corresponds to q ≤ 0.5, the lower rectangle in Figure 1, in which the equilibrium outcome
is pooling the buyer types through an immediate proposal of the equal division that is instantly accepted by
both buyer types. Figure 2(b) corresponds to q > 0.5 and δ ≤ 0.5, the upper left rectangle in Figure 1, in
which, depending on the exact parameter values, the equilibrium outcome is either pooling or separating
buyer types by risking one period of delay. Figure 2(c) corresponds to q > 0.5 and 0.5 < δ ≤ 2
3
, the upper
middle rectangle in Figure 1, in which, depending on the exact parameter values, the equilibrium outcome
is either pooling or separating buyer types by risking two periods of delay. The dashed paths in the period
2 continuation games indicate omitted utility values.
5. Discussion
For a low probability of bargaining with a self-interested buyer q ≤ 0.5 the equilibrium strategies and
belief support only a pooling outcome. Due to the low chance to bargain with a self-interested buyer,
the expected utility of asking a price higher than half is never more than half. Thus, the seller prefers
immediate agreement on the equal surplus division with all buyer types. In contrast, as it becomes more
likely for the seller to bargain with a self-interested buyer, the equilibrium strategies and beliefs support
either a pooling equilibrium or a separating outcome. If the proportion of self-interested buyers q > 0.5
is sufficiently large in relation to δ < 2
3
, the seller maximizes his expected utility by offering such that
only a self-interested buyer will accept in period 1. In such a separating strategy, delay results from
disagreement and continuation of the bargaining with an envious buyer or an imitating self-interested type.
If discounting δ ≤ 0.5 is low, imitation of envy is too costly for the self-interested buyer. He accepts the
higher price 1− δ(1− δ) in the screening period 1. The envious buyer additionally signals his type by
rejecting an unequal p1. His period 2 counteroffer δ will be accepted by the seller. Thereby the envious
buyer’s counteroffer is less than half of the pie but the seller prefers the low price to the equal division
in the final period due to the low patience. If discounting δ ∈ (0.5, 2
3
] is moderate, it costs more time to
exclude imitation by a self-interested type and agreement on equal division with an envious buyer follows
in period 3 after he signaled his type by rejecting an unequal p1 and offering an unacceptable price p2
in period 2.
The preference between the pooling and separating outcomes depends on the seller’s patience in
relation to the probability of bargaining with a self-interested buyer once the probability q > 0.5 is high.
If δ ≤ 2
3
and q > 0.6, then both separating outcome are preferred to the pooling outcome. Whether
separating the buyer types in equilibrium requires one or two periods of delay depends merely on the
discount factor δ. As the perfectly envious buyer suffers infinitely from accepting any disadvantageous
division, he never imitates self-interested behavior. In contrast, a self-interested buyer gains utility through
being offered the equal division if he would pass undetected as an envious type. Therefore, the more
patient the players become, the more time must pass between the disadvantageous opening price and the
equal division that the seller would like to offer to the different buyers in order to separate buyer types.
If players are more patient, i.e., δ > 2
3
, and the buyer is likely to be self-interested, i.e., q > 0.5, then
a delay of two periods before dividing equally is no longer sufficient to deter the self-interested buyer
from imitating the envious type. Yet, the seller does not maximize utility by offering the equal division to
all buyer types for a sufficiently high chance to bargain with self-interested buyer. In an infinite horizon
game, the incentive of a self-interested buyer to imitate envy could be eliminated by the seller and the
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envious buyer through delaying their agreement on the equal division beyond two periods. In the finite
horizon game, the scope for delay is limited through the length of the game. Nevertheless, the players can
reduce the incentive of the self-interested buyer to imitate the envious type in addition to a physical delay
by playing mixed strategies that exclude, at least sometimes, an agreement between the envious buyer and
the seller in period 3. Such equilibria are not considered in the paper, but I established that for sufficiently
high q and high δ no pure strategy equilibria exist.
The model above postulates an uninformed self-interested seller and assumes perfect envy as the
unknown social preferences of some buyers. The dynamics observed in this model, however, applies
to a more general context. Suppose a different model of social preferences implied that some buyers
accept also other divisions than the equal split while their behavior remains different from a self-interested
buyer. Intuitively, when social preferences increase the attractiveness of the outside option to a buyer, then
his obtainable share increases and the incentive of a self-interested buyer to imitate social preferences
increases too. Therefore, in cases of lower envy, the seller has a lower incentive to separate the buyer
types and a self-interested buyer has a reduced interest in imitating. That is, the seller’s incentive increases
whereas a self-interested buyer’s incentive decreases the likelihood of observing the pooling equilibrium.
For two bargainers with social preferences, Kohler [29,30] studied the impact of commonly known envy
or guilt on the bargaining outcome in a model of open-ended alternating-offer bargaining. Even if both
bargainers have similar social preferences, the bargaining outcome can differ from the division agreed
by self-interested bargainers. The depicted deviations from the bargaining outcome of self-interested
bargainers may cause imitating, screening and signaling when there is uncertainty about the opponent’s
preferences like in the example of one-sided perfect envy.
6. Conclusion
This paper modeled heterogeneity of social preferences as the source of one-sided incomplete
information in an alternating-offer bargaining problem. Assuming that a buyer who moves second
is either perfectly envious (that is he rejects any offer less than the equal division of the trade surplus) or
self-interested, equal as well as unequal division and occasional occurrence of delay have been rationalized
in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the studied three period game, the informed buyer may be screened
by the uninformed seller in the first period, in which case the seller demands the larger share of the surplus
accepted only by a self-interested buyer. An envious buyer is willing to forgo immediate agreement
in order to signal his type. As the cost of learning the buyer type is one or more periods of delay if
bargaining is with an envious buyer, the seller may not be interested in screening or receiving a signal.
Therefore, two categories of optimal seller behavior exist depending on the players’ patience and the
seller’s believed likeliness to encounter a buyer with the respective preferences. Confronted with a low
probability to realize a large share against a self-interested buyer, the seller backs off from learning the
buyer preferences and instantly offers the equal division, which is always accepted immediately in this
pooling equilibrium. As the probability to bargain with a self-interested buyer increases, the risk-neutral
expected utility maximizing seller no longer prefers immediate acceptance of all buyer types. If the
probability of bargaining with a self-interested buyer is high (or the seller believes it is high), then the
seller initially demands a large share and first period rejection by an envious buyer is observed. Through
the delay of agreement the envious buyer signals his type. With relatively patient bargainers, a second
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rejection may be observed as the envious buyer must make an unacceptable counteroffer, after rejecting
the seller’s opening offer, to deter the self-interested buyer from worthwhile imitating and to thereby
signal his type. Unsettled bargaining goes on and ends with the equal division at latest in period 3
although in both cases the buyer has revealed his envious type by his period 2 offer. If discounting and
the probability to bargain with a self-interested buyer are high, the finite game is too short to send a
credible signal about the uncertain preferences and no pure strategy equilibrium exists. In addition to
divisions more equal than forecast by Rubinstein [2] and delay, the model reproduces further regularities
of bargaining behavior not explicitly discussed in the paper: The bargaining outcome, inter alia, depends
on the bargainers’ impatience. The payoff distribution on the equilibrium paths uniquely favors the
proposing player who demands at least half of the surplus. In a separating equilibrium the seller eventually
accepts disadvantageous counteroffers by an envious buyer or asks for less than the equal division himself
after he learned the buyer type. As the highly stylized model of social preferences allows for alternative
interpretations, relaxing the assumption of perfect envy (or its alternative interpretations) in different
directions may help to either further discriminate or to unify competing explanations of bargaining
behavior in future research.
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Appendix
Definition. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a strategy pair (ŝs, ŝb) and a set of beliefs of the
seller that the buyer is self-interested satisfying the following requirements:
(E1) The seller’s equilibrium strategy ŝs maximizes the seller’s discounted expected utility given the
buyer’s equilibrium strategy ŝb.
(E2) For each buyer type b ∈ {c, e}, the buyer’s equilibrium strategy ŝb maximizes the buyer’s discounted
utility given the seller’s equilibrium strategy ŝs.
(E3) The seller belief µ̂t in period t is formed by Bayes’ theorem from the equilibrium strategies at each
information set.
Notation uti(sj\s˜tj) indicates the utility uti of player i in period t if player j adopts his strategy
sj = {s1j , s2j , s3j}, in which the t-th element is substituted by s˜tj given the other player’s equilibrium
strategy ŝi. As ∂utb/∂pt ≤ 0 and ∂uts/∂pt > 0, it is sufficient to look at the maximal/minimal prices
at which behavior of the buyer types/seller changes. piH := 1 − δ(1 − δ) denotes the division that
corresponds to the backwards induction outcome of a three period bargaining game with a self-interested
buyer. piL := 1− δ(1− 0.5δ) denotes the division a self-interested buyer just accepts in period 1 if he
could obtain the share of an envious buyer in the continuation game.
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Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of proposition 1 follows from three lemmas. Lemma 1 establishes the PBE for q ≤ 0.5
(Figure 2(a)), lemma 2 for q > 0.5 and δ ≤ 0.5 (Figure 2(b)) and lemma 3 for q > 0.5 and δ ∈ (0.5, 2
3
]
(Figure 2(c)). In each lemma, I show for each player and type that there is no profitable deviation from the
equilibrium strategy, emphasized in the figures, given the beliefs at the decision nodes and the equilibrium
strategy of the other player. Afterwards, I prove that the assumed beliefs follow from Bayes’ theorem
given the equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 1. If q ≤ 0.5, then there is a pooling equilibrium with outcome (0.5, 1). The equilibrium is
supported by the strategy pair (ŝs, ŝb) and beliefs µ̂t given in Table 1.
Table 1. Strategies and beliefs if q ≤ 0.5.
The seller’s equilibrium strategy ŝs and belief µ̂t
t ŝts µ̂
t
1 0.5 q
2 Y if p2 ≥ 0.5δ, else N 0 if p1 = piL and p2 = 0.5δ, else q
3 0.5 µ2
The buyer’s equilibrium strategy ŝb
t ŝtc ŝ
t
e
1 Y if p1 ≤ piL, else N Y if p1 ≤ 0.5, else N
2 0.5δ 0.5δ
3 Y Y if p3 ≤ 0.5, else N
Proof I show that the strategy pair (ŝs, ŝb) and belief µ̂t satisfy the PBE requirements:
(E1) In period 3, both buyer types maximize utility by accepting the equal division. Given
µ̂3 ∈ {0, q} and q ≤ 0.5, the seller maximizes expected utility with ŝ3s = 0.5 because
u3s(ss\0.5) = 0.5 is weakly larger than Eu3s(ss\1) = µ̂3. In period 2, the utility of s2s ∈ {Y,N} is
u2s = p2 and u
2
s = 0.5δ, respectively. Hence, Y s N if p2 ≥ 0.5δ as implied by ŝ2s. In
period 1, the utility of s1s ∈ {0.5, piL, 1} is maximized by ŝ1s = 0.5 as u1s(ss\0.5) = 0.5,
Eu1s(ss\piL) = µ̂piL + 0.5δ2(1− µ̂) ≤ 0.5 if µ̂ ≤ 0.5 and Eu1s(ss\1) = 0.5δ2 ≤ 0.5.
(E2) In period 3, the self-interested buyer’s best response ŝ3c is to accept any price as, otherwise, the
bargaining ends in disagreement with zero payoff. In period 2, the utility of s2c ∈ {0, 0.5δ} is
maximized by ŝ2c = 0.5δ as u
2
c(sc\0.5δ) = 1− 0.5δ is larger than u2c(sc\0) = 0.5δ. In period 1, the
utility of s1c ∈ {Y,N} is u1c(sc\Y ) = 1 − p1 and u1c(sc\N) = δ(1 − 0.5δ), respectively. Hence,
Y c N if p1 ≤ piL as implied by ŝ1c . In period 3, the envious buyer’s best response ŝ3e is to accept
any price equal or less than half and to reject otherwise as, afterwards, the bargaining ends with
zero payoff to both. In period 2, ŝ2e equals ŝ
2
c because payoffs are larger than half and similar for
both buyer types in this subgame. In period 1, the utility of s1e ∈ {Y,N} is u1e(se\Y ) = 1− p1 if
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p1 ≤ 0.5, else −∞, and u1e(se\N) = δ(1 − 0.5δ), respectively. Hence, Y e N if p1 ≤ 0.5 as
implied by ŝ3e.
(E3) In period 1, the seller’s unconditional belief is the frequency of the self-interested buyer in the
population. Both buyer types accept an price p1 ≤ 0.5 and reject p1 ∈ (piL, 1]. In period 2, after
rejection of p1 /∈ (0.5, piL] both types make counteroffer p2 = 0.5δ and the seller receives no
information, i.e., µ̂2 = q. If p1 ∈ (0.5, piL], then only the self-interested buyer accepts and, hence,
µ̂2 = 0. In period 3, the seller moves between information sets and receives no information. 
Lemma 2. If q ∈ (0.5, 1−2δ2
2−2δ ] and δ ≤ 0.5, then there is a pooling equilibrium with outcome (0.5, 1). If
q > 1−2δ
2
2−2δ and δ ≤ 0.5, then there is a separating equilibrium. Its outcome is (piH , 1) if bargaining is with
a self-interested buyer. Its outcome is (δ, 2) if bargaining is with an envious buyer. The equilibrium is
supported by the strategy pair (ŝs, ŝb) and beliefs µ̂t given in Table 2.
Table 2. Strategies and beliefs if q ∈ (0.5, 1−2δ2
2−2δ ] and δ ≤ 0.5.
The seller’s equilibrium strategy ŝs and belief µ̂t
t ŝts µ̂
t History
1 0.5 if q ∈ (0.5, 1−2δ2
2−2δ ], else pi
H q −
2 Y if p2 ≥ δ, else N q p1 /∈ (0.5, piH ]
Y if p2 ≥ δ, else N 0 if p2 = δ, else q p1 ∈ (piL, piH ]
Y if p2 ≥ 0.5δ, else N 0 if p2 = 0.5δ, else q p1 ∈ (0.5, piL]
3 1 µ2 p1 /∈ (0.5, piH ]
0.5 if p2 = δ, else 1 µ2 p1 ∈ (piL, piH ]
0.5 if p2 = 0.5δ, else 1 µ2 p1 ∈ (0.5, piL]
The buyer’s equilibrium strategy ŝb
t ŝtc ŝ
t
e History
1 Y if p1 ≤ piH , else N Y if p1 ≤ 0.5, else N −
2 δ δ p1 /∈ (0.5, piL]
0.5δ 0.5δ p1 ∈ (0.5, piL]
3 Y Y if p3 ≤ 0.5, else N Any
Proof I show that the strategy pair (ŝs, ŝb) and belief µ̂t satisfy the PBE requirements:
(E1) In period 3, the action of one or both buyer types changes if s3s ∈ {0.5, 1}. Given µ̂3 ∈ {0, q}
and q > 0.5, the seller maximizes expected utility Euts(sb|µ̂t) with ŝ3s because u3s(ss\0.5) = 0.5 is
smaller than Eu3s(ss\1) = q if µ̂3 = q, i.e., for histories other than p1 ∈ (0.5, piL] and p2 = 0.5δ
or p1 ∈ (piL, piH ] and p2 = δ. In period 2, the utility of s2s ∈ {Y,N} is u2s = p2 and Eu2s = 0.5δ
or Eu2s = µ̂δ, respectively. Hence, Y s N if p1 ∈ (0.5, piL] and p2 ≥ 0.5δ or p1 ∈ (piL, piH ]
and p2 = δ as implied by ŝ2s. In period 1, the utility of s
1
s ∈ {0.5, piL, piH} is maximized by
ŝ1s = 0.5 if q ≤ 1−2δ
2
2−2δ and by ŝ
1
s = pi
H otherwise as, for µ̂1 = q and q > 0.5, the expected
utility Eu1s(ss\piL) = µ̂piL + 0.5δ2(1 − µ̂) ≤ 0.5 is weakly smaller than u1s(ss\0.5) = 0.5 and
Eu1s(ss\piH) = qpiH + (1− q)δ2. The comparison of latter implies the threshold.
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(E2) In period 3, the self-interested buyer’s best response ŝ3c is to accept any price as, otherwise, the
bargaining ends in disagreement with zero payoff. In period 2, the utility of s2c ∈ {0, 0.5δ, δ} is
maximized by ŝ2c = 0.5δ if p1 ∈ (0.5, piL] and by ŝ2c = δ otherwise as, depending on the history,
these prices are the discounted period 3 agreements just accepted by the seller who rejects s2c = 0
giving the buyer utility u2c(ss\0) = 0. In period 1, the utility of s1c ∈ {Y,N} is u1c(sc\Y ) = 1− p1
and u1c(sc\N) = δ(1− 0.5δ), respectively. Hence, Y c N if p1 ≤ piL as implied by ŝ1c . In period
3, the envious buyer’s best response ŝ3e is to accept any price equal or less than half and to reject
otherwise as, afterwards, the bargaining ends with zero payoff to both. In period 2, ŝ2e equals ŝ
2
c
because payoffs are larger than half and similar for both buyer types in this subgame. In period 1,
the utility of s1e ∈ {Y,N} is u1e(se\Y ) = 1−p1 if p1 ≤ 0.5, else−∞, and u1e(se\N) = δ(1−0.5δ),
respectively. Hence, Y e N if p1 ≤ 0.5 as implied by ŝ1e.
(E3) In period 1, the seller’s unconditional belief is the frequency of the self-interest buyer in the
population. Both buyer types accept a price p1 ≤ 0.5 and reject p1 ∈ (piH , 1]. In period 2, after
rejection of p1 /∈ (0.5, piH ] both types make the same counteroffer p2 ∈ {0.5δ, δ} and the seller
receives no information, i.e., µ̂2 = q. If p1 ∈ (0.5, piH ], then only the self-interested buyer accepts
p1 ∈ (0.5, piH ]. Hence, µ̂2 = 0 if his acceptance is followed by rational action. In period 3, the
seller moves between information sets and receives no information. 
Lemma 3. If q ∈ (0.5, 1−δ2
2−δ(2−δ) ] and δ ∈ (0.5, 23 ], then there is a pooling equilibrium with outcome
(0.5, 1). If q > 1−2δ
2
2−δ(2+δ) and δ ∈ (0.5, 23 ], then there is a separating equilibrium. Its outcome is (piH , 1) if
bargaining is with a self-interested buyer. Its outcome is (0.5, 3) if bargaining is with an envious buyer.
The equilibrium is supported by the strategy pair (ŝs, ŝb) and beliefs µ̂t given in Table 3.
Table 3. Strategies and beliefs if q ∈ (0.5, 1−δ2
2−δ(2−δ) ] and δ ∈ (0.5, 23 ].
The seller’s equilibrium strategy ŝs and belief µ̂t
t ŝts µ̂
t History
1 0.5 if q ∈ (0.5, 1−δ2
2−δ(2−δ) ], else
piH
q −
2 Y if p2 ≥ δ, else N 0 if p2 = 0, 1 if p2 = δ, else q p1 /∈ (0.5, piL]
Y if p2 ≥ 0.5δ, else N 0 if p2 = 0.5δ, else q p1 ∈ (0.5, piL]
3 0.5 if p2 = 0, else 1 µ2 p1 /∈ (0.5, piL]
0.5 if p2 = 0.5δ, else 1 µ2 p1 ∈ (0.5, piL]
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Table 3. Cont.
The buyer’s equilibrium strategy ŝb
t ŝtc ŝ
t
e History
1 Y if p1 ≤ piH , else N Y if p1 ≤ 0.5, else N −
2 δ 0 p1 /∈ (0.5, piL]
0.5δ 0.5δ p1 ∈ (0.5, piL]
3 Y Y if p3 ≤ 0.5, else N Any
Proof I show that the strategy pair (ŝs, ŝb) and belief µ̂t satisfy the PBE requirements:
(E1) In period 3, the action of one or both buyer types changes if s3s ∈ {0.5, 1}. Given µ̂3 ∈ {0, q, 1}
and q > 0.5, the seller maximizes expected utility with ŝ3s because u
3
s(ss\0.5) = 0.5 is smaller
than Eu3s(ss\1) = µ̂3 ∈ {q, 1}, i.e., for histories other than p1 /∈ (0.5, piL] and p2 = 0 or
p1 ∈ (0.5, piL] and p2 = 0.5δ. In period 2, the utility of s2s ∈ {Y,N} is u2s = p2 and Eu2s = 0.5δ
or Eu2s = µ̂δ, respectively. Hence, Y s N if p1 ∈ (0.5, piL] and p2 ≥ 0.5δ or p1 /∈ (0.5, piL]
and p2 = δ as implied by ŝ2s. In period 1, the utility of s
1
s ∈ {0.5, piL, piH} is maximized by
ŝ1s = 0.5 if q ≤ 1−δ
2
2−δ(2−δ) and by ŝ
1
s = pi
H otherwise as, for µ̂1 = q and q > 0.5, the expected
utility Eu1s(ss\piL) = µ̂piL + 0.5δ2(1 − µ̂) ≤ 0.5 is weakly smaller than u1s(ss\0.5) = 0.5 and
Eu1s(ss\piH) = qpiH + 0.5δ2(1− q). The comparison of latter implies the threshold.
(E2) In period 3, the self-interested buyer’s best response ŝ3c is to accept any price as, otherwise,
the bargaining ends in disagreement with zero payoff. In period 2, for δ ≤ 2
3
, the utility of
s2c ∈ {0, 0.5δ, δ} is maximized by ŝ2c = 0.5δ if p1 ∈ (0.5, piL] and by ŝ2c = δ otherwise as,
depending on the history, these prices are the discounted period 3 agreements just accepted by
the seller who rejects s2c = 0 giving the buyer utility u
2
c(ss\0) = 0.5δ. In period 1, the utility
of s1c ∈ {Y,N} is u1c(sc\Y ) = 1 − p1 and u1c(sc\N) = δ(1 − δ), respectively. Hence, Y c N
if p1 ≤ piH as implied by ŝ1c . In period 3, the envious buyer’s best response ŝ3e is to accept any
price equal or less than half and to reject otherwise as, afterwards, the bargaining ends with zero
payoff to both. In period 2, the envious buyer utility of asking an acceptable price p2 may be
lower than the utility he gets from a rejection if he can thereby signal his type. The utility of
s2e ∈ {0, 0.5δ, δ} is maximized by ŝ2e = 0.5δ if p1 ∈ (0.5, piL] and by ŝ2e = 0 otherwise because,
depending on the history, u2e(ss\0.5δ) = 1 − 0.5δ is larger than u2e(ss\0) = 0 if p1 ∈ (0.5, piL]
but u2e(ss\δ) = 1− δ is smaller than u2e(ss\0) = 0.5δ if p1 /∈ (0.5, piL]. In period 1, the utility of
s1e ∈ {Y,N} is u1e(se\Y ) = 1−p1 if p1 ≤ 0.5, else−∞, and u1e(se\N) = δ(1−0.5δ), respectively.
Hence, Y e N if p1 ≤ 0.5 as implied by ŝ1e.
(E3) In period 1, the seller’s unconditional belief is the frequency of the self-interest buyer in the
population. Both buyer types accept a price p1 ≤ 0.5 and reject p1 ∈ (piH , 1]. In period 2, after a
p1 ∈ (0.5, piL] both types would make the same counteroffer p2 ∈ 0.5δ but the seller updates his
belief on the equilibrium path to µ̂2 = 0 from the self-interested buyer’s acceptance of this price.
If p1 /∈ (0.5, piL], each types may make a different counteroffer p2 ∈ {0, δ} and the seller updates
his belief to µ̂2 = 0 after p2 = 0, made only by the envious buyer, and to µ̂2 = 1 after p2 = δ,
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made only by the self-interested buyer. In period 3, the seller moves between information sets and
receives no information. 
Proof of Proposition 2
I show that the best pure strategy of the seller is dominated by a mixed strategy for q > 0.5 and δ > 2
3
:
For δ > 2
3
, the self-interested buyer will reject p1 = piH if he can realize either outcome (0.5δ, 2) or
outcome (0.5, 3) in a later period pooling equilibrium. An optimal strategy of the seller ŝs, however, must
include a starting price that is at least accepted by the self-interested buyer. Thus, the seller’s best pure
strategy candidate either asks p1 = 0.5 in a pooling strategy, or it asks p1 = piL in a separating strategy, or
it asks p1 = piH , accepts p2 ≥ δ and demands p3 = 1 in another separating strategy. Comparing the seller
utility of the two separating strategies, qpiL + 0.5(1− q)δ2 < qpiH implies that immediate agreement on
piH at the cost of excluding the envious buyer from trade is preferred. Yet, the seller can further gain
utility by choosing a mixed separating strategy s˜3s that divides equally in period 3 with probability l
such that the envious buyer accepts sometimes but the self-interested buyer continues to weakly prefer
immediate acceptance. That is, Eu1s(ss\s˜3s) = qpiH + 0.5l(1 − q)δ2 > qpiH with probability l such
that u1c(ss\piH , sc\Y ) = piH is just equal to u1c(ss\piH , sc\N) = 0.5lδ2. In period 1, the seller utility is
maximized by the equal division if q < 1−lδ
2
2piH−lδ2 and by the mixed separating strategy ss\s˜3s otherwise.
The comparison of u1s(ss\0.5) = 0.5 and Eu1s(ss\s˜3s) implies the threshold. The preference for a pooling
strategy is bounded by liml→0 1−lδ
2
2piH−lδ2 =
1
2piH
(dashed red curve in Figure 1). As sequential rationality
requires the mixed strategy in the separating continuation game even if the pooling outcome is preferred,
no PBE exists in pure strategies for δ > 2
3
and q > 0.5. 
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